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GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA: ANTECEDENTS, 
PROPOSITIONS AND PECULIARITIES
1
  
 
ABSTRACT                                                                                                                                                   
Relying on an alternative theoretical framework (i.e. institutional theory), rather than 
the dominant agency theory, this paper examines the connections between corporate 
governance mechanisms and good practices, as informed by an empirical and 
contextual analysis. On the basis of research methods triangulation, this study 
presents nine specific antecedents of good corporate governance in weak institutional 
settings (Nigeria). The study proposes how each of these antecedents must be 
understood, articulated and harnessed, on the basis of relevant institutional 
peculiarities, in order to address contextual governance challenges. This study adds to 
the institutional theorising of good corporate governance, by paying attention to the 
context (African), efficiency (instrumentality) and legitimacy (symbolic) in 
explaining the firm-level drivers of good governance practices in an international 
business environment.  
 
Keywords: Good Corporate Governance; Agency Theory; Institutional Theory; 
Nigeria; Africa; International Business; International Corporate Governance 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The agency theory was seminal in furthering modern corporate governance 
discussions. However, corporate governance in an international business context is 
notably influenced by institutional factors (Williamson, 1985; Powell & DiMaggio, 
                                                 
1
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1991; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Creed, Dejordy, & 
Lok, 2011; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Orientations towards the antecedents of 
good corporate governance across varying national economies should therefore 
inculcate a broader perspective of institutional contingencies (Aoki, 2001; Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Granapathi, 2007).  
Institutionalism based corporate governance literature progresses discussions much 
further from the boards of directors, to the legal structures and financial markets, and 
to the wider cultural understandings about the role of the corporation in a modern 
society (Davies, 2005). This has led to a maturing recognition of the institutional 
effects on corporate governance in developed countries (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Aguilera, 2005; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin & Very, 2007). In developing countries, 
usually marred by weak institutions, there is a comparative lacuna in literature even 
though there are prospects of a promising debate.  
 
In this debate, a question that remains unanswered is how firms can, by themselves, 
promote good corporate governance in weak institutional settings? This is an 
important question for both local and international business firms. In providing 
insights to this question, this research inquiry employs a case study of Nigeria in order 
to investigate how good corporate governance can be promoted at the firm level in a 
weak (corrupt) institutional environment. The Nigerian weak institutional context 
makes corporate law enforcement and self-regulatory initiatives remain in idealism 
(Yakasai, 2001; Ahunwan, 2002).  Also, relevant market pressures such as the market 
for corporate takeovers and shareholder activism are either absent, non-vibrant or 
corrupt (Adegbite, Amaeshi & Amao, 2012). This study thus accounts for the 
institutionally peculiar challenges and deficits inherent in corporate Nigeria and 
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suggests effective ways to address them at the firm level. This is done in the light of 
the applicability of main-stream theories, and the danger of ‘taken for granted 
assumptions’. The study approaches the phenomenon of good corporate governance 
from a less normative stance and presents how the agency and institutional 
perspectives both obtain in the Nigerian environment. As a result, this study 
highlights areas of similarities of the Nigerian environment in the context of the 
extant literature, as well as accentuates important institutional contingencies and how 
these shape corporate governance.  
 
This forges ahead an institutional theorising of good corporate governance, by paying 
attention to the context, efficiency/instrumentality and legitimacy of good governance 
mechanisms in an international business environment. Discussions in this paper also 
help to contribute to the comparative institutionalist perspective of corporate 
governance with insights from a less discussed research site – Nigeria (Jackson & 
Deeg, 2006; Bohle & Greskovits, 2006; Taylor & Nolke, 2008; Adegbite, Amaeshi, & 
Nakajima, 2013). Empirically, this further adds to the budding literature on corporate 
governance in African countries (Briston, 1978; Abor, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2007; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Sanda, Mikailu & Garba, 2010; Bokpin, 2011; 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Oogarah-Hanuman, 2012; Mangena, Tauringana & 
Chamisa, 2012; Ntim, Opong & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Also, the 
study highlights the benefits of a qualitative design and a reliance on institutional 
theory in examining the antecedents of good corporate governance in weak 
institutional contexts.  
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Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy (The Economist, 2014), provides a useful empirical 
context due to the distinctiveness of its corporate governance system from the 
frequently researched Anglo-American systems. For example, the development of 
corporate governance in Nigeria is characterised by founding families who frequently 
retain control on boards and on the management. Most times, the family is also 
responsible for corporate strategic direction and performance outcomes of public 
listed companies (Husted & Allen, 2006; Lien, Piesse, Strange & Filatotchev, 2005; 
Adegbite et al., 2013). Also, corporate Nigeria presents a moderate representativeness 
of corporations in sub-Saharan Africa. However, whereas the cavernous lacuna in 
literature on corporate governance in Nigeria is receiving increasing scholarly 
attention (Okike, 2007; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011a), authors have predominantly 
focussed on the environmental determinants of corporate governance in the country. 
This paper extends the macro-level descriptions of the budding empirical literature by 
presenting firm-level drivers of good corporate governance and offering suggestions 
on how African nations can structure their business corporations to prevent corporate 
corruption
i
. The rest of this study is organised as follows. The author first presents a 
review of relevant literature which guided the development of the research question 
and thereafter the methodology adopted in this study. Next, the findings are discussed. 
Lastly, contributions are summarised and some implications for theory, practice and 
future research are highlighted. 
 
1.2 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (CORPORATE) GOVERNANCE: 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH FOCUS 
Dominant perspectives on the drivers of good corporate governance across the world 
have been situated within the agency theoretical framework. An agency relationship is 
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related to or resulting from a contract under which shareholders (principals) engage 
managers (agents) to perform some service on the former’s behalf, involving the 
delegation of decision making authority to the latter (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory provides a framework for examining the relationship and contentions 
between shareholders and management (Fama, 1976, 1980). This is due to the self-
behavioural tendencies of managers, given the separation of firms’ ownership from 
control (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The principal-agent framework 
thus suggests how shareholders can ensure that managers protect and maximize their 
wealth by putting in place drivers of good corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). These drivers primarily seek to align the interests of managers with 
shareholders (Filatotchev, Jackson, Gospel & Allcock, 2007; Miller, 2010; Wahab & 
Holland, 2012; Lopes & Walker, 2012). Good corporate governance is therefore a 
reflection of a company’s values, culture and policies concerning the maximization of 
shareholder value in a legal, ethical and sustainable way (Murthy, 2006; Demirag, 
Sudarsanam & Wright, 2000).  
 
Agency theory, premised upon developed Anglo-Saxon markets, is however limited 
in shaping academic and organisational approaches to corporate governance in an 
international business context (Learmount, 2003; Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram & 
Walsh, 2000). For example, there is empirical evidence that normative drivers of good 
corporate governance cannot be transplanted across countries without significant 
misalignment (Hove, 1986; Chang, 1992; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011a; Demirag et 
al., 2000). The agency framework does not encapsulate the multi-dimensional 
complexity and character of the corporate governance phenomenon in an international 
context (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Van Eves, Gabrielsson & Morton, 2009; Adegbite 
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& Nakajima, 2011a; Gomez-Meijia & Wiseman, 2012). Furthermore, the agency 
conflict can be dealt with in different ways in different countries. For example, it is 
addressed through dispersed ownership, markets for corporate control and contractual 
incentives in the UK and USA, and through weaker managerial incentives and greater 
supply of debt in continental Europe and Japan (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Forker & 
Green, 2000; Miller, 2010).  The agency theory is therefore unable to fully account 
for cross-country differences in its operationalization. This is particularly relevant to 
comparative discourse on national systems of corporate governance, and for the 
corporate governance of international businesses.  
 
The agency theory also suffers from another important limitation in international 
business governance research.  The theory presupposes the operation of an efficient 
and competitive market environment, where corporate ownership is dispersed, 
information asymmetries are minimal and competitive pressures are maximal 
(Udayasankar, Das & Krishnamurti, 2005). In many developing market economies, 
however, these agency theory presumptions are predominantly invalid. For example 
the aftermath of Nigeria’s independence from Britain in 1960 led to an indigenisation 
programme which resulted in majority ownership (by government, individuals and 
families) in corporate Nigeria (Nmehielle & Nwauche, 2004). As a result, there is no 
single best institutional arrangement for organizing economic systems and corporate 
governance (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997). International business (corporate) 
governance scholarship is thus enriched by the appreciation of local institutionalisms 
which shape the configuration and dynamics of corporate governance in varieties of 
capitalism.   
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Institutional theory offers a helpful complementary lens to the agency theory. 
Institutional theory accounts for the deeper and resilient aspects of socio-cultural 
structure, and considers the processes by which organisational schemas, rules, norms, 
and routines are established as guidelines for corporate behaviour (Scott 1987, 2004). 
Local organisational structures arise as reflections of rationalised institutional rules 
which function as myths that organisations incorporate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Recent studies have thus begun to document the institutional effects on different areas 
of international corporate governance studies. These studies include the institutional 
effects on family businesses (Leaptrott, 2005); on corporate governance and director 
accountability (Aguilera, 2005); and on corporate social responsibility (Campbell, 
2007). On the country level, Liu (2006) documented the effects of China’s unique 
institutional setting in the pre-determination of its corporate governance model. 
Boehmer (1999) did a similar analysis with Germany. The institutionalist perspective 
provides insights into the complexity of corporate governance structures and practices 
with regards to their peculiarities across sectors, nations and regions. These 
peculiarities become even more important when comparison is drawn between strong 
and weak institutional contexts (such as Nigeria).  
 
Recent and on-going developments in Nigeria continue to focus scholarly, practice 
and policy attention on the corporate governance debate.
ii
 In addition, the peculiarities 
of Nigeria’s turbulent history of public and corporate corruption provide a rich 
outlook to show how good corporate governance can be promoted amidst weak 
institutional parameters. Corruption is a measure of the strength of an institutional 
environment and corporate governance. For example, the World Bank Anti-
Corruption and Governance Index is based on six broad measures of good governance 
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including: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability, (3) government 
effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption 
(Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2008). Based on all of these criteria, Nigeria is 
regarded as a very weak and corrupt institutional context (Kaufmann et al., 2008; 
Adegbite et. al., 2012). Furthermore, at number 144 out of 177 countries on the 
Transparency International (TI) 2013 corruption index, Nigeria remains one of the 
most corrupt countries in the world, despite the country’s anti-corruption efforts in the 
past decade. Also the World Bank’s Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC) in the corporate governance practices in Nigeria highlights significant 
institutional weaknesses in terms of regulation, compliance, and enforcement 
capacities (ROSC, 2004).  The numerous corporate governance scandals in the past 
decade and the limited success of regulatory reforms and prosecution of offenders 
further help to underscore the usefulness of a Nigerian case study for this research 
inquiry (Okike, 2007; Adegbite et. al., 2012; 2013; Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; 
Yakasai, 2001). This research study is thus guided by the question:  How can firms 
promote good corporate governance (and prevent corporate corruption) in weak 
institutional settings? In other words, what are the key antecedents of good corporate 
governance at the firm level in developing countries? The findings of this inquiry will 
help augment the literature on corporate governance in developing countries, which 
suffers from a comparative dearth, particularly in relation to the institutional 
(contextual) drivers of good corporate governance. 
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
The study adopted a mix of the following qualitative research methods: in-depth 
interviews, focus group discussions, direct observations and case studies.
iii
 This 
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helped in the development of knowledge, in the exploration of experience and 
context, in understanding multiple perspectives, and in understanding the complexity 
in which corporate governance exists in Nigeria (Morse, Swanson & Kuzel, 2001; 
LeCompte & Schensul, 1999; Creswell, 1998; Yin, 1994). This further helped to 
provide a flexible relationship with the respondents, encouraging a great depth and 
richness of context (Aaker, Kumar & Day, 2001). It thus offered a better 
understanding of the subject matter as they relied on understanding processes, 
behaviours, and conditions (Flick, 1992; Wang, 2006; Van Maanen, 1979). The mix-
method approach allowed access to corporate governance specialists, across different 
professional/disciplinary backgrounds and institutional capacities (see Tables 1 and 
2). Given their positions, this research benefited from their insider views of the 
drivers of good corporate governance in sub-Saharan Africa (see also Filatotchev et 
al., 2007; Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & Jackson, 2008; Hendry, Sanderson, Barker 
& Roberts, 2007; Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Das, 1983; Van Maanen, 1998; Patton, 
1980). This further brought high degrees of objectivity and reliability into the process 
of identifying the drivers. Also, this enriched data, prevented similitude, and served as 
an experimental control mechanism upon which different views were assessed and 
compared. 
 
From the outset, 112 key potential respondents, were identified and contacted via 
emails, telephone calls, and in person, outlining the research agenda.  Snow-balling 
technique and third party informants who have useful industry links also proved 
helpful to gain access to these high-calibre respondents (see also, Amaeshi, Adi, 
Ogbechie & Amao, 2006) until data saturation was reached.
iv
 Part of the data 
collection process included a two month field work in Nigeria between May and July, 
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2008 and another one month data collection in September 2012. The latter data 
collection efforts in 2012 helped to validate, update, as well as gather further evidence 
on the themes that emerged from the data from 2008. Particularly, the data 
respondents in 2008 were re-consulted in 2012 and the views they expressed were 
consistent and helpful in addressing and re-examining the research inquiry. 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
An interview/focus group guide was sent to potential respondents in order to facilitate 
their preparation (Lynn, Turner & Smith, 1998). This also enabled respondents to 
broadly discuss issues which led to in-depth comments, beyond the ‘confines’ of the 
questions asked, thus constituting a rich data on the research topic. The guide (see 
appendix) are in line with previous studies (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Hendry et al., 
2007; Aguilera et al., 2008), and were pre-tested to ensure their validity, reliability 
and contextual relevance. The participants were promised confidentiality to encourage 
uninhibited responses. Therefore, numerical codes (from D1 to D42) have been used 
to anonymise their identities. This is also the case with responses from focus group 
respondents. The use of numerical codes further indicates the spread of responses 
across the entire respondents. Wide-ranging questions were asked in order to gain a 
set of comparable responses drawn from real life business and personal experiences 
free from fear or bias (Sewell, 2008). The average duration of interviews was 60 
minutes. In total, there were 26 interviews, which were face-to-face and tape-
recorded.  
 
Furthermore, two focus group sessions were held in Lagos – the financial capital of 
Nigeria; one had 9 members and the other had 11, totalling 20 respondents. In order to 
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increase the efficiency of the focus groups and to allow members to expressly discuss 
the topics of interest without actual or perceived intimidation, the size of the groups 
were kept small (see Ewings, Powell, Barton & Pritchard, 2008). Certain degrees of 
overall representation were achieved with participants drawn from different 
backgrounds and functions, so as to harness a mix of different perspectives. 
Discussions were tape recorded and each took an average of 90 minutes. The total 
number of respondents for the interviews and focus group discussions is 42
v
, 
representing a response rate of 37.5% of the original 112 key contacts. Direct 
observations of annual general meetings and case study analysis further facilitated the 
triangulation of evidence across different sources.
vi
  
 
The overall methodology helped to understand, contextualise and rigorously verify 
the impediments as well as the antecedents of good corporate governance in Nigeria 
and thus formed the basis of the subsequent descriptions and discussions. There was a 
very high degree of agreement amongst respondents’ comments, which were also in 
alignment with the observations made and cases studied.  The data collected were 
largely representative due to the multi-stakeholder participation and the lack of 
commonality among the respondents who refused/or could not be interviewed or 
participate in focus group discussions.
vii
 In order to minimise respondents’ position 
bias (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997), respondents who satisfied the purposive 
sampling requirement of competence were those selected (Hughes & Preski, 1997).  
 
The data collection techniques employed generated over 1,000 pages of transcribed 
texts which were qualitatively analysed in two phases. The first phase was a pilot, 
which constituted some familiarisation and random sense making of the data. This 
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preliminary interpretation of the data suggested some patterns around the drivers of 
good corporate governance in Nigeria as it relates to her institutional context. A 
coding scheme was then developed around these emergent themes. The data were 
analysed with Nvivo 8 – qualitative data analysis software– and the inter-coder 
reliability was well over 90%.  Extracts from the data (see Table 3 for the 
demographic information of related respondents), presented in italics, have been 
employed to further indicate the link between the findings and discussions.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
1.4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
1.4.1 The Corporate Governance Challenge in Nigeria 
Following independence, Nigeria’s economic liberation strategy gave rise to four 
main groupings of corporations in terms of their ownership structure (see Table 4). 
With a possible exception of Group B companies, the findings of this research, in the 
main, suggest that the state of corporate governance in Nigeria is notably 
unimpressive across all groups, despite some achievements in the past decade. The 
history of corporate enterprising and governance in the country has been tainted with 
several high-profile corporate failures and corruption in various sectors of the 
economy.
viii
 Findings suggest that corruption is rife in the Nigerian private sector 
(Punch, 2010; Yakasai, 2001; Adegbite et. al., 2012). 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Four major recurring themes, at the firm level, emerged from the research data with 
regards to the rationale behind the corruption and the poor state of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. They are as follows:   
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1. Weak board governance: encompasses the lack of sufficient capability, 
independence and heterogeneity in board composition, bogus board reputation 
and non-robust board evaluation.  
2. Weak executive monitoring and accountability: due to corrupt shareholder 
activism by shareholders’ associations and the lack of vibrant institutional 
shareholders. 
3. Corporate (private) corruption: between the board and managers, mostly at the 
expense of uninformed minority shareholders and other stakeholders. This 
allows for an opaque executive compensation structure which reinforces 
corporate corruption. 
4. Public - private corruption: involves collaboration of regulators with 
corporations to circumvent regulatory provisions and perpetrate corruption. 
 
Taking into account Nigeria’s institutional climate on the one hand and grounding in 
prior literature on the other hand, the following discussions examine nine firm-level 
antecedents of good corporate governance in Nigeria as generated by the research 
data. Respondents were generally unanimous with regards to the vital importance of 
these antecedents although there were subtle differing perspectives regarding how to 
promote some of them. Discussions take a less normative approach towards these 
drivers, which is prevalent in the extant literature, but accounts for the peculiarity and 
specificity of the sub-Saharan African context. As a result, discussions herein suggest 
alternative approaches and modifications in enacting these drivers to collectively 
promote good corporate governance in an international business context. 
 
1.4.2 Good Corporate Governance in Nigeria: Antecedents and Propositions 
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 1.4.2.1 Board independence  
Board independence connotes a willingness to bring a high degree of rigour, scrutiny 
and objectivity to the evaluation of a company’s management (Langevoort, 2001).  
For instance, consolidating the roles of the CEO and that of the chairman into one 
position amounts to undue concentration of power and influence into one individual, 
which jeopardises board independence (Daily & Dalton, 2003; Filatotchev et al., 
2007).  Whilst there is inconclusive evidence to correlate board independence with 
firm performance in the finance literature (see Bhagat and Black 2002), an 
interviewee D41 noted that “…. We were able to improve our corporate governance 
when we separated the two roles.” In another interview, D3 notes as follows; “I 
stepped down as chairman voluntarily to improve our governance structure and 
processes.” Also interviewee D25 highlights that: “a board needs the benefits of “two 
wise men” to administer the responsibilities of the CEO and Chairman.” This is in 
agreement with the management and international business strategy literature which 
suggests that the absence of CEO/Chairman duality promotes efficiency and better 
firm performance (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Black & Kim, 2007). However, this study 
found out that many CEOs, upon retirement, become the chairmen and continue to 
retain strong influences on their successors. As a focus group respondent (D7) notes, 
“we still need real board independence.”An interviewee (D39) also highlights thus: 
“I became the chairman after I retired as the CEO”. This situation is common 
especially as many Nigerian CEOs are majority (or strong minority) owners of their 
company’s shares which enables easy transmutation of CEOs into the Chairmen of 
companies (Ahunwan, 2003). This study proposes that a dispersal of share ownership 
is a precursor to achieving board independence in Nigeria.   
 
15 
 
Furthermore, there are regulatory provisions which encourage all board committees 
(especially board audit committees) to be composed of independent directors, 
including members of shareholders’ associations. However this research study found 
out that even as members of shareholders’ associations may be appointed to the 
board and board committees, executive managers corrupt their independence (D7). 
This study proposes that board independence in Nigeria will have to extend beyond 
the legal framework and the prescriptions of corporate governance regulation, but 
must address the executive management capture of the regulatory arrangement. Also, 
findings of this study show that the traditional role and overbearing influence of 
family ownership on the appointment of board members limits their oversight 
function and independence (see also Klein, Shapiro & Young, 2004; Macavoy & 
Millstein, 2003). Although reliance on certain independence standards can lead to 
practicable structural reforms and promote effective corporate governance (HLR, 
2006), the author proposes a healthy combination of directors who are and who are 
not linked to the controlling shareholder and management (D41).  
  
 1.4.2.2 Board heterogeneity  
Board heterogeneity is important (Coffey & Jia, 1998; Cox & Blake, 1991; 
Robinson & Dechant, 1997). However, board heterogeneity, in terms of age, human 
capital and ethnic tribe are important diversity parameters that must be 
contextually considered in order to promote board cohesiveness and effectiveness 
in Nigeria. The requirements for directorship appointments as prescribed by the SEC 
Code and the CBN Code are that individuals of high calibre must occupy board 
positions. However, a respondent D29 notes that “there are not that many highly 
experienced executives, such that you have to appoint the same people on different 
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boards.” This study proposes that imposing a limit on multiple directorships may 
inhibit board effectiveness and efficient governance. This view was widely held by 
other respondents. 
Furthermore, boards of Nigerian firms, especially those that operate nationally, have 
to reflect the diverse cultural ethnicity of the country in their composition. Although, 
there is no regulatory requirement for this, the rationale behind it extends to the 
essence and informal resolutions of the post-colonial Nigerian republic
ix
. As a result, 
there is a strong societal expectation for ethnical spread in the governance of 
corporations. “Boards with sufficient tribal diversity are considered to have better 
governance systems and will further have a sense of belonging and identity 
throughout the country” (D10). This is also important to customer loyalty, brand 
reputation and eventual firm performance. Hence the author proposes that tribal 
diversity should be reflected in board composition in Nigeria. The reflection of tribal 
identities in boards could itself be informed by consideration of religious differences 
along tribal lines in Nigeria.
x
 
 
Lastly, there were inconclusive results from this research with regards to the role 
played by age heterogeneity in board composition. According to interviewee (D3) 
younger directors “ask more searching governance related questions”.  Some 
respondents however noted that experience of the Nigerian complex business 
environment, spanning over many years of executive life, is important in the board of 
large companies. A proposition which thus emerges for Nigeria is that of a healthy 
combination of both young and older directors (see Fox, 2007). Also, an interesting 
line of future research inquiry would be to examine the relationship dynamics 
between young and old directors. This would be insightful given that the Nigerian 
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society is culturally characterized by a large power distance and strong uncertainty 
avoidance (The Hofstede Centre, 2013), with board appointments usually based on 
age and seniority. 
 1.4.2.3 Board (directors’) reputation  
This study proposes that reputable board members bring credibility to the company. 
A respondent (D9) noted that “the problem we have … in the corporate sector is that 
of leadership crisis. We simply have corrupt leaders at the helm of affairs. There are 
only few reputable people”. According to respondent (D20); “directors with high 
repute are more objective”. “There is a very strong link between the quality of our 
governance and the reputation of our board members” (D4). However, there is a 
limited market for this group of highly experienced and reputable directors. This 
highlights the need to increase the number of such individuals, which relates to raising 
aspirations towards professionalism and good behaviour (Chun-An & Chuan-Ying, 
2008). 
 
 1.4.2.4 Board evaluation 
The regulatory framework (the CBN and SEC codes) notes that board performance 
appraisal should be done by an outside consultant. However, this practice has resulted 
in a box-ticking exercise, where the performance of all board members is rated 
optimum. The results of this study are consistent with Carey (1993) as well as Bassett 
(1998) and posit that self-evaluation of directors is the preferred alternative.While self 
(internal) evaluation and external evaluation are options which have their benefits and 
limitations, this study proposes that “one thing not to do because of the Nigerian 
cultural peculiarity is to conduct a board appraisal which resembles a ‘boss-
employee’ type” (D35). Although board evaluation is still relatively unpopular in 
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Nigeria, board performance should be assessed in terms of individual members’ 
appraisal as well as the entire board. With respect to this, there is the need for relevant 
stakeholders to be educated on the benefits of effective board evaluation.  
Furthermore, Nigeria is witnessing the emergence of advisory groups, nominated by 
shareholders, to guide, monitor and provide board evaluation. Advisory groups are 
comprised of retired board chairmen of high repute and useful experience in board 
processes and corporate governance. Although boards are not bound by their 
recommendations, their persuasion, calibre and reputation create a sense of authority 
and an indirect/informal but effective board evaluation. This “is taken very seriously 
by board members” (D20). “An advisory board can be regarded as a “council of 
elders”” (D41). This research study proposes that advisory boards should be 
encouraged as overarching informal governance mechanism, as this further draws 
legitimacy from the Nigerian culturally inclined regard for the opinion of elders.  
 
 1.4.2.5 Foreign (Large) institutional shareholders 
Institutional investors are expected to provide adequate policing of corporate 
management in ways which individual dispersed shareholders are incapacitated to do 
(Jacoby, 2007; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Romano, 2001). In Nigeria, both local and 
foreign institutional investors are currently playing limited roles in the corporate 
governance of listed firms. “Like ordinary passive individual shareholders, they tend 
to be focused only on the short term returns… not corporate governance” (D33).The 
impact of the few indigenous institutional shareholders has also been constrained by 
the size of their investments. This study found out that there is a significant 
expectation that large institutional investors, especially foreign/international ones, can 
promote good corporate governance in Nigeria. However, this study proposes that in 
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order for foreign institutional investors to be effective, their board member 
representative needs to be someone with sufficient human capital and knowledge of 
the Nigerian business terrain(D39)” The board member representative must have the 
courage to challenge executive corruption. Foreign institutional shareholders can 
further constitute a rich resource for new ideas and can provide the long-term 
financing that corporate Nigeria requires (Sherman, 1990).
xi
  
 
1.4.2.6 Effective shareholder activism 
The recent emergence of shareholder associations in Nigeria was encouraged to 
coordinate several small, passive and dispersed shareholders (Adegbite et. al., 2012; 
Okike, 2007; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008). However, the undermined capacity of 
shareholder activists to get useful information from companies constitutes an 
executive management constructed barrier to impede activism. Commenting on the 
problem, respondent D3 noted thus: “during my time as CEO, we had a policy of 
inviting members of shareholder associations …to our factories. By keeping them … 
informed, we ... could improve the quality of our AGMs through informed shareholder 
participation.” This study proposes that only informed and non-corrupt shareholder 
activism is capable of promoting good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria is also witnessing the rise of two types of shareholder activists. The first 
classification is the emergent middle class (mainly young and middle-aged 
professionals), who do not necessarily belong to any shareholder association. They 
make efforts to attend AGMs and other meetings regularly and in the process have 
developed a degree of sophisticated expertise with regards to scrutinising companies’ 
governance. For example, they are able to ask important questions on issues bordering 
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on several aspects of corporate disclosures – including financials, ethical investments, 
corporate social responsibility and employee relations – during AGMs and through 
other means such as letter writing. The author refers to this classification as “the 
sophisticated shareholders”. Given the high level of illiteracy in Nigeria, many 
small investors have limited capacity to make reasonable deductions from companies’ 
financial statements and accounts in order to inform their investment decisions. As 
such “these shareholders constitute a very helpful and powerful expression of 
activism in the Nigerian environment” (D35). 
 
The second classification consists of reputable shareholders who are high-calibre 
individuals with a record of excellent behaviour and distinguished accomplishments 
in various high profile corporate positions (D6). During AGMs, they constitute a 
major voice and are able to scrutinise the board and management, who would not 
want to be seen as going against the recommendations of highly regarded corporate 
leaders. The author refers to this class as “the reputable shareholders.” Given the 
challenge of corporate corruption and recurring corporate scandals in Nigeria, persons 
of high standards of integrity continue to constitute a powerful and positive force for 
informed and ‘veteran shareholder activism’. The results of this study suggest that 
both classes have demonstrated a considerable amount of genuine activism. The 
author thus proposes that these emergent shareholder classes, if institutionally 
encouraged, would be instrumental in promoting effective shareholder activism and 
good corporate governance. 
 
 1.4.2.7 Performance related executive compensation 
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The agency theory perspective on performance related executive compensation 
summits that when managers' wealth is not tied directly to firm value, managers may 
lack incentives to maximize shareholder interests and ensure good governance (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Harvey & Shrieves, 2001; Randøy & Nielsen, 2002). In 
developing countries such as Nigeria, performance related executive compensation is 
still in its infancy. Although there are increasing evidences of monetary based 
executive compensation schemes in the Nigerian banking industry, findings of this 
study suggest that executives do not appear to be well compensated. There is not yet a 
strong performance related executive compensation culture in Nigeria, which is 
impacting on corporate governance and managerial conduct. Respondent D1 notes 
that “if executives are not well compensated, they create other avenues to accrue 
money to themselves, at the expense of shareholders.”  
 
However, given the high rate of poverty in the country, there is a societal disapproval 
with regards to paying executives huge bonuses by the Nigerian public and the 
regulatory bodies. For example, the 2003 SEC code states that there should be 
disclosure where a director’s earnings are in excess of N500, 000 ($3,260). When 
companies make such disclosures about their executive compensation, “what 
normally follows is a public highbrow that the directors are milking the company dry 
(D24)”, which encourages executives to resolve to more corrupt and hidden means to 
accrue wealth. However, while better performance related executive compensation 
schemes will promote good corporate governance in Nigeria, caution must be 
exercised.  Specifically, the profitability “potentials of a particular company must 
inform its executive compensation” (D3). Executive compensation schemes must 
consider the overall performance of business operations, thus limiting the tendency of 
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management to engage in accounting mal-practices to misrepresent the position of the 
company. Thus the author proposes that a decent and explicitly defined reward system 
is needed to inform good corporate governance in Nigeria.  
 
1.4.2.8 Full and transparent information disclosure   
Findings from this research suggest that timely, comprehensive and transparent 
disclosure on some fundamental issues will improve the quality of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. These issues include the following: “financial/ operating 
results; ownership structure; members of board of directors and management; 
quantitative and qualitative matters relating to employees and other stakeholders in 
the corporation; governance structures and policies; corporate targets and prospects; 
as well as execution of unusual and complex transactions” (Mallin, 2002: 253). In 
particular, Nigerian companies with employee share ownership schemes (ESOs) must 
make such disclosures. ESOs potentially benefits two classes of individuals, whose 
agenda could be different. On the one hand, it benefits “employees through the 
returns they can potentially get on their investments as well as some degree of 
employment security” (D6). On the other hand, it gives the “right to vote” and since 
most employees/employee representatives focus less on this important power (D4), 
managements are able to influence employee representatives to vote in their favour. 
For example, during take-over bids and potentially positive changes in the governance 
of companies, managers are able to remain in control by convincing employees that 
their jobs are more secure with them than the potential in-coming management. The 
author proposes that full disclosure, including disclosures on ESO, contributes to 
effective monitoring of the firm and good corporate governance. This would 
necessitate the identification of weaknesses in existing disclosure requirements and/or 
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inadequate enforcement of the disclosure regulations (Hawley & Williams, 1997; 
Clausen, 1979). 
 
 
1.4.2.9 Independent audit committees 
Research into board audit committees has not extensively explored the subject of their 
independence (Spira, 1999), especially in developing economies (Al-Mudhaki & 
Joshi, 2004). Independence is crucial to board audit committees. However, “in 
Nigeria, we have statutory provisions for the independence of board audit 
committees, but in a situation where members lack personal integrity but are greed 
driven, they only become managerial puppets” (D8). Furthermore, the relationship 
between board audit committee members and managements of companies have long 
been “too cordial” (D27) to ensure an independent supervision of the audit process 
(Mautz & Neumann, 1970; Okike, 1994). This research study proposes that moral 
uprightness and individual integrity are the major instruments of an independent 
board audit committee function in Nigeria, beyond regulation. 
 
1.5 FURTHER DISCUSSIONS 
The foregoing discussions indicate that the successful operationalization of the 
highlighted drivers must account for relevant socio-cultural and institutional 
contingencies. Although, some of these drivers have been highlighted in prior 
literature, a ‘one size fits all approach’ remains undesirable for international business 
(corporate) governance. Also, certain perspectives based on the peculiarities of 
developed countries, may not be able to prescribe the antecedents of good corporate 
governance for developing countries such as Nigeria. Discussions have shown 
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important peculiarities and variations with regards to how good corporate governance 
mechanisms need to be understood and assembled to address contextual challenges 
and promote good corporate governance in an international context. The main drivers 
of good corporate governance and their Nigerian peculiarities (in italics) are presented 
in Table 5.   
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Accounting for the institutional effects on corporate governance in Nigeria have 
helped to shed more understanding on the legitimacy, necessity, applicability, 
dynamics and effectiveness of certain governance mechanisms in weak institutional 
settings. Thus it is important that models for good corporate governance are not 
populated in isolation of the rest of the institutional underpinnings (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011a; Guillen, 2000). The institutionally based peculiarity of the Nigerian 
context suggests that taking a normative (agency theory centric) approach to good 
corporate governance in an international context would be inherently limiting and 
over-assuming. No doubt, some of the findings connect with the logic of agency 
theory, but in the main, they suggest that a variant of agency theory will constitute a 
cornerstone of corporate governance theory (Jensen, 1998; Lubatkin et. al., 2005, 
2007). Indeed, a significant amount of the data elaborated on governance issues not 
captured by the basic construct of the principal-agent model. This study has therefore 
provided insights which go beyond the generalizations inherent in the extant 
literature. For example, international business firms operating in developing countries 
such as Nigeria must especially bear in mind the peculiarities of the Nigerian context 
and the uniqueness of the interdependent drivers.  
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1.6 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study presents important implications for scholarly, practical and policy 
discourses on comparative/international business (corporate) governance research. 
Discussions herein also forge ahead a critical and contextual perspective on corporate 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study provides evidence on the antecedents 
of good corporate governance practices in Nigerian firms using qualitative research 
methodology through a non-rational theoretical lens. In particular, relying on an 
alternative theoretical framework (i.e. institutional theory) rather than the dominant 
agency framework (e.g., Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Van Eves et al., 2009; Gomez-
Meijia & Wiseman, 2012), discussions offer new theoretical and empirical insights. 
These insights bring to the fore the limitations of some international business 
approaches that focus on formal institutions and neglect how they work in practice. 
Alternatively, the study highlights the usefulness of an institutional analysis in 
understanding firm behaviour in weak institutional contexts (Wood, Dibben, Stride & 
Webster, 2010; Lau, Fan, Young & Wu, 2007; Aguilera, et. al., 2008; Puffer & 
McCarthy 2003; Adegbite, et. al. 2013; Park & Kim, 2008; Judge, Naoumova & 
Koutzevol, 2003; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). Therefore, there is need for 
modifications to our understanding of agency relationships, as the nine antecedents 
discussed indicate. International organisations involved in corporate governance 
monitoring/development across borders must take note.  
 
Theoretically, this study also adds to the institutional antecedents of good corporate 
governance, by paying attention to the context (African), efficiency (instrumentality) 
and legitimacy (symbolic) in explaining why firms may engage in good governance 
practices in an international business environment (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
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Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Judge et al., 2008, 2010; McCarthy & Puffer 2008; Lien et 
al., 2005; Lau et.al., 2007). This paper also adds to the empirical literature on the 
institutional determinants of corporate governance, with a sub-Saharan African 
(Nigerian) perspective. This is much needed as the literature on comparative corporate 
governance across countries has been mainly concerned with the debate across 
Western - Eastern countries and/or along Anglo-American - European lines. Also, 
most discussions on less developed countries have centred on the BRICS economies.  
 
Methodologically, this research brings to the fore the need for more qualitative 
research on corporate governance relationships aimed at advancing extant governance 
theories and working towards the development of new streams of governance 
frameworks and understandings. A step forward in this regard is this study’s 
integration of participants’ commentaries across multiple sources of data, which helps 
to bring to light, representative and contextualized interpretation of good corporate 
governance. Indeed, as much of the literature on corporate governance continues to 
employ hypo-deductive quantitative research designs (e.g., Zattoni & Judge, 2013), 
this study contributes to the literature by offering a more nuanced insight from this 
close-up approach.  
 
This paper also contributes to the African topical policy debate regarding the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (Wijewardena & Yapa, 1998). 
Nigeria is a regional power.
xii
 The Nigerian government has tasked itself to make the 
country to be one of the 20 largest economies in the world by year 2020, by being 
able to maintain its economic leadership role in Africa. However, Nigeria must put in 
place an effective corporate governance framework in order to become a respected 
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and significant player in the global (and African) political economy. The discussions 
in this paper are not only useful to the Sub-Saharan African business scholarship but 
offers suggestions on how African nations can structure their business corporations to 
address corporate corruption through good corporate governance. 
 
1.7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
First, although discussions herein are about the antecedents of good corporate 
governance, distinguishing between good and bad governance suggests that there is an 
element of comparison. The data collected for this study does not lend itself 
significantly to such quantifiable measurement. This provides an opportunity for 
future studies to quantitatively test the relationship between the nine interdependent 
drivers (and propositions) and actual corporate governance improvements at the level 
of individual firms
xiii
. In essence, future studies could develop the propositions 
presented in this paper into testable hypotheses. 
 
Second, such research across different African economies would present a basis for 
identifying similarities which would guide the theorising of corporate governance in 
Africa. Although the discussions presented in this study have implications for many 
developing countries, caution must be exercised in making complete generalisations 
with regards to their applicability in other jurisdictions, due to differing institutional 
arrangements. Moreover, identifying which governance practices are relevant, those 
not readily applicable, and those requiring additional considerations/contextualisation 
can inform more empirical corporate governance research in Africa. In Africa, South 
Africa (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006; Ntim, et. al. 2012) and Nigeria (Okike, 2007; 
Adegbite, et. al. 2012, 2013) seem to be leading the debate on corporate governance 
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with an emergent literature in Ghana (Mensah, Aboagye, Addo, & Buatsi, 2003) and 
in Egypt (Abdel & Shahira, 2002; Boutros-Ghali, 2002). The author hopes that this 
paper will encourage further corporate governance research in other African 
jurisdictions where the subject is even at a more infantry state.  Another useful line of 
future research inquiry would be to examine if there are any parallels between the 
governance challenges reported in this study and those experienced by small/family 
businesses in developed nations. 
 
Third, although this paper’s institutional account provides a promising avenue to 
supplement some of the limitations of agency theory, neo-institutionalism may not 
fully capture the dynamics of corporate governance. Theories of political 
institutionalism (North, 1990; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008) are also useful in 
offering insights applicable to similar weak governance environments. This will go 
beyond the Nigerian case and help in providing coherent theoretical generalizations 
that could result from other methodological stances. Future research should take note. 
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Appendix: Experts’ Interviews and Focus Groups ‘Guide/Areas for Discussions’  
 (see Filatotchev, et. al. 2007) 
 
In terms of promoting good corporate governance in Nigeria, how important are, 
 
1. The following aspects of the board: board size; board independence; human 
capital of independent board members; and board heterogeneity; Regular evaluation of 
board members; Frequency and lengths of board meetings; Regular meetings of 
independent directors; Regular communications with major shareholders/investors; 
Board focus on financial controls; Board focus on strategic controls; Directors’ 
financial incentives; age and term limits for directors; Extensive and timely provision 
of information to independent directors; Bottom-up information flow from functional 
departments to independent director; and Independent directors’ social ties with 
CEO/executive directors. Please indicate other aspects/factors that you consider 
important. 
 
2. The following types of shareholders: Pension funds, mutual funds, foundations, 
corporate pension funds; Banks; Insurance companies; Private equity investors; 
Individual (non-family) blockholders; Family blockholders; and Dispersed individual 
shareholders Please indicate any other types that you consider important 
 
 
3. The following aspects of shareholder activism: Publicly criticizing board 
members; Influencing board and management turnover; Influencing revisions of 
executive compensation; Regular discussions with board members of strategy issues; 
Maintaining stable shareholding; Voting at the AGM; Use of electronic voting 
systems; Disclosure of voting at shareholder meetings; and Use of lawsuits against 
managers and  auditors for negligence or breaches of duty. Please indicate any other 
aspects that you consider important  
 
4. The following executive pay related items and processes: Performance-related 
bonus ; Share option incentive scheme; Long term incentive plan; Non-remuneration 
based incentives (e.g. firm’s pension contribution); Caps on the size of executive pay; 
Shareholders to vote on remuneration; Incentives tied to performance targets; Issuing 
“out of the money” options; High levels of pay disclosure; Remuneration committee’s 
access to external profession advice ; and The costs of issuing share options clearly 
shown in the annual report and accounts. Please indicate any other items and processes 
that you consider important. 
 
5. The following forms of public and private disclosure of information: Annual 
report and related documents; Quarterly or monthly reports; Operating and financial 
reviews; Information specifically on corporate governance (e.g. director’s pay); 
Information on related party transactions; Information on corporate social 
responsibility, employment policies and environmental policies; Audit committee’s 
oversight of publicly disclosed information; Private information to key investors; 
Private information to analysts; Provision of information to employees and other 
stakeholders. Please indicate any other important aspects  
 
6. The following audit related items and mechanisms for internal control: Board 
approval of external auditor appointment; Shareholders’ vote on appointment of the 
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external auditor; Regular rotation of appointed external auditor; Professionally qualified 
members on the audit committee; Reporting from the audit committee to shareholders; 
Please indicate any other important audit related items or internal control mechanism 
 
7. The following aspects of the market for corporate control: An active M&A 
market; Hostile takeovers; Leveraged buy-outs; Management buy-outs; Public-to-
private transactions; Mandatory bid rule; Principle of equal treatment of shareholders; 
Transparency of ownership and control (inc. defensive measures). Please suggest other 
aspects that you consider important  
 
8. The involvement in company decision-making process of the each of the 
following stakeholders: Debtholders; Employees; Customers; Suppliers; Local 
communities; NGOs; and the government? Please suggest other stakeholders who are 
important  
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i
 “Corruption which has traditionally been at the centre of corporate governance issues in Nigeria (and 
especially in Nigerian banks) thrived and became a ‘way of life’, during the military regimes which 
followed the country’s independence from Britain. For example, in the early 1990s, the country’s 
financial sector experienced a major turbulence which resulted in the collapse of several financial 
institutions, and led to the erosion of investors’ confidence (ROSC, 2004). This was as a result of 
several corrupt practices and dealings which involved managers and directors of listed banks” 
(Adegbite, 2012a; 214). 
ii
 Some of the recent regulatory reforms on corporate governance in Nigeria include the 2003 Code of 
Corporate Governance in Nigeria (SEC Code); the 2006 mandatory Code of Corporate Governance for 
Nigerian Banks post consolidation (CBN Code); the 2007 Code of Conduct for Shareholder 
Associations in Nigeria; and the National Code of Corporate Governance which is currently being 
developed. Whilst these codes have helped shape the debate on corporate governance in Nigeria, they 
have led to a plethora of regulation, at times, conflicting and encouraging non-compliance.  
iii
 This study is part of a larger research project which critically examined the major internal and 
external determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2010a), including a scrutiny 
of corporate governance (Adegbite, 2010b), the state of corporate governance and responsibility in 
Nigeria (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011b), the institutional determinants of good corporate governance 
in Nigeria (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011a)  and the emergence of institutional maintenance (Adegbite 
and Nakajima, 2012), the regulation of corporate conduct in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2012b), the politics of 
shareholder activism in Nigeria (Adegbite et al., 2012) and the implications of the multiple influences 
on corporate governance practice in Nigeria (Adegbite et. al, 2013); hence the extensive 
methodological approach adopted 
iv
 Data saturation occurs when the data already collected copes adequately with new data without 
requiring continual extensions and modifications (Dey, 1999). 
v
 The total number of respondents is 42, as opposed to 46 (26+20) given that 4 interviewees were also 
part of the focus group respondents.  
vi
 Direct observations were made in order to complement and validate the data collected through 
interviews and focus group discussions. For example, the annual general meetings (AGMs) of two 
listed corporations were attended and observed. Here, the author took down notes of proceedings and 
interactions. Attending these AGMs allowed for more access into the complex interactions between 
stakeholders, which inform corporate governance in Nigeria, providing insights into what research 
subjects do, and not what they say (Wells & Lo Sciuto, 1996). This engagement through observation 
further helped to understand the context of study and offered a very fast and focused investigation, in 
such a way that the researcher is watching rather than taking part and become immersed in the entire 
context (Trochim, 2000). Furthermore, in ensuring further validity of data collected from prior 
methods, findings were further interrogated by looking deeper into the specific situations and contexts 
(case studies). Two of the major sources of information were documents and archival records. 
Documents included relevant memoranda, corporate agendas, media reports, and regulatory 
administrative documents.  Archival records included past companies’ annual reports and accounts, 
annual general meeting minutes, chairmen’s statements, past regulatory records, amongst others. 
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vii
 In the main, their very busy engagements, inability to fix a suitable appointment, and the 
time/resource constraints during the data collection process are responsible for their refusal/non 
participation. Furthermore, notably beneficial to the data are the views of the representatives of civil 
society bodies in Nigeria, such as the aforementioned SCGN, Convention of Business Integrity (CBI), 
and Transparency Nigeria.  The research further leveraged on these to identify and gain access to 
respondents whose perspectives on the research topic are largely homogenous and similar to those non-
affiliated with these organisations. Throughout the data collection process, the author remained flexible 
and ensured adequate methodological self-consciousness to avoid potential bias in data collection and 
interpretation, thus minimising negative obtrusiveness and ensuring conceptual flexibility (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) and as a result, enhancing both the data-gathering and eventual credibility (Harrington, 
2002). 
viii
See: Ahunwan, 2002; Okike, 2007; and Yakasai 2001 for in-depth review of the corporate 
governance system in Nigeria and how it has evolved over time. For more discussions on the corporate 
governance mechanisms in Nigeria such as equity ownership structure and board composition see 
Ahunwan 2002; Adegbite 2012b. 
ix
 Nigeria became independent in 1960 and a republic in 1963, amalgamating three major 
geographical/ethnic characters of the country (Northern Hausa, Western Yoruba and Eastern Igbo). 
x
 Nigeria is roughly divided between a mainly Muslim North and a Christian South. 
xi
 Institutional investors who are playing increasingly active roles in the Nigerian corporate governance 
system include Actis, Renaissance Capitals and Capital Alliance. They demand, as part of their terms 
of investments, that they get specific board member allotment (s). 
xii
 In a 2005 Goldman Sachs report (see Wilson & Stupnytska, 2005), Nigeria was listed among the 
"Next Eleven" economies as having a high potential to become one of the largest economies in the 
world Nigeria (alongside  Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South 
Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam) was listed among the "Next Eleven" economies as having a high 
potential to become one of the largest economies in the world. Goldman Sachs ratings centred 
predominantly on the degrees of economic and political stability, and based on these parameters 
suggested that Nigeria retains the potential of becoming a true pace setter in economic development in 
Africa). Furthermore, Nigeria is important in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of size, location, population, 
and natural resources and particularly the role it plays in the African economy. Corporate governance 
in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and largest market for goods and services, continues to 
attract notable local and international interests and influences, given the significant influx of foreign 
investments in the country (NSE, 2012; Adegbite, et. al. 2013).  Nigeria has also recently become the 
largest economy in Africa, following the country’s GDP rebasing. 
xiii
 As Nigeria is currently undergoing a process of developing a National Corporate Governance Code, 
the institutional provision for some of these drivers would facilitate research into their effectiveness 
and impact in the future. 
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GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA: ANTECEDENTS, 
PROPOSITIONS AND PECULIARITIES: LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: A breakdown of the professional/disciplinary backgrounds of the 
respondents 
Background/research field Number of experts 
Economics 4 
Business management 4 
Finance and accounting 15 
Law 11 
Sociology 3 
Others (Manufacturing, HRM, Sciences 
etc.) 
5 
 
 
Table 2: A breakdown of respondents’ institutional expertise/capacity 
Institutional expertise/capacity Regulatory Academia Practice 
Regulatory 17   
Academia  4 5 
Practice   16 
 
Table 3: A breakdown of cited respondents’ institutional capacities 
Anonymous 
Code 
Demographic Information 
D1 A vice-chairman of a large listed firm in Nigeria  
D3 A former CEO/chairman of a large listed Nigerian firm  
D4 A chairman of a large Nigerian corporation  
D7 A non-executive director of a listed Nigerian company  
D8 A senior corporate governance regulatory officer  
D9 A member of the board of a number of large listed companies 
D10 CEO of a private organisation  
D12 An independent director on a number of high-profile boards  
D13 An executive member of a notable shareholder association in 
Nigeria  
D20 A reputable director serving on many boards 
D21 A senior official of corporate governance regulatory agency  
D25 A senior official of a corporate governance regulatory agency  
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D29 A member of the board of a number of large listed companies 
D33 A senior executive of a Nigerian investment bank  
D35 A lead consultant to the committee which drafted the 2003 SEC 
code 
D39 A chairman of a large Nigerian corporation  
D41 An independent director of a listed Nigerian firm  
 
 
Table 4: Ownership groupings of Nigerian corporations (Ahunwan 2002; 271-
272) 
Groupings  Descriptions 
A Consists of corporations wholly-owned by government. Both the federal 
government and state governments operate wholly-owned corporations, 
including major petroleum refineries and petrochemical plants. 
B Consists of joint venture arrangements between the federal government 
and foreign crude oil producing corporations. A key indicator of the 
importance of this sector is the fact that the government of Nigeria 
derives about 97% of its total revenue from joint ventures in oil and gas. 
C Consists of publicly listed corporations. Here foreign investors have 
traditionally operated with local investors in the industrial and 
commercial sector, where the foreign investors are mostly subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprise, and hold majority stakes. However, many public 
companies are now solely indigenously owned, across various sectors of 
the economy, including banking, insurance, manufacturing amongst 
others. This group constitutes the majority of public companies. 
D Consists of privately owned corporations that are not listed on the stock 
market. Most of these are family-owned and are small companies, owned 
and operated by families and friends and lacking business sophistication. 
Some of these enterprises, however, are quite large, with a capital base 
comparable to many listed corporations. 
 
Table 5: Recognized Good Corporate Governance Mechanisms (Particularities in 
the Nigerian Context) 
Board 
Structure 
Director 
Independen
ce 
Director 
Heterogenei
ty 
Board 
Monitori
ng 
Sharehold
er (SH) 
Activism 
Disclosure 
& Other 
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Separate 
Chair/CEO  
Retired 
CEO 
reduces 
independenc
e. 
Mix of age, 
experience, 
background 
Directors 
to be of 
high 
reputation 
Institutiona
l investors 
control 
managers 
Executive 
compensati
on plan 
Independe
nt audit 
committee 
Mix of  
linked/ not 
linked to 
owners 
Cultural 
ethnicity 
Self-
evaluatio
n by 
directors 
– no 
formal 
Emergent 
SH 
activists to 
minimise 
corruption 
Full 
disclosure 
to SH, 
especially 
on ESOs 
Formal 
evaluation 
of board 
Avoid exec 
mgmt. 
capture 
Tribal 
diversity 
Advisory 
groups as 
monitors 
Strong 
family 
presence 
Corrupt 
institutiona
l 
environme
nt 
No limit 
on 
directorshi
ps held 
Dispersed 
share 
ownership 
Gender 
diversity not 
applicable 
Audit 
committee 
must have 
competen
ce  and 
integrity 
 
  
 
 
 
 
